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THE BUILDING OF CHINA’S GREAT WALL AT
SEA
Raul (Pete) Pedrozo∗

I. INTRODUCTION
On October 15, 1962, photographs from a U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft revealed that the Soviet Union was secretly assembling
intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Cuba.1 A week later, President
Kennedy publicly revealed the discovery of the missiles and announced
that the United States was imposing a maritime quarantine to prevent the
introduction of additional missiles and materials to Cuba.2 Following a
number of confrontations at sea, on October 28, 1962, Nikita
Khrushchev gave in to U.S. demands for the removal of nuclear weapons
from Cuba.3 As Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated: “We’re eyeball to
eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.”4
Nearly fifty years later, two rival powers once again stood eyeball to
eyeball, but this time it was the United States that “blinked.” China, in
recent years, has strenuously objected to U.S. intervention in the South
China, East China, and Yellow Seas. Despite proclaiming an interest in
∗
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1. Cuban Missile Crisis, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM,
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Cuban-Missile-Crisis.aspx (last visited
Apr. 6, 2012).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Thomas Blanton, Annals of Blinksmanship, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVES, GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIV., http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/annals.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2012).
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the region and voicing support for its regional partners, the United States,
until recently, has largely failed to demonstrate its support by taking
action. China’s neighbors have been forced to succumb to Chinese
pressure, with no actual assistance from the United States. By engaging
its “anti-access strategy,” China has been the victor in numerous high
profile showdowns with neighboring claimants in this region. China has
flexed its newfound muscle and has been successful in using force and
threatening economic sanctions to accomplish its goals.
These events mark the beginning of the final phase of China’s effort
to erect a new great wall at sea—a wall that has been under construction
since the end of World War II. China has built walls since the fifth
century B.C. to protect itself from invasion.5 While previous wallbuilding efforts were confined to land, China has turned its attention to
the sea and is attempting to assert sovereignty over disputed islands and
vast maritime resources, to protect and expand its southern and eastern
maritime boundaries, and to enhance its naval capabilities to counter
U.S. Navy dominance in the Pacific. Unless the United States and its
allies take immediate, proactive steps to counter Beijing’s resurgence in
its self-proclaimed zone of influence, any hope of keeping China from
dominating the western Pacific will be lost.
II. THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:
CREATION OF THE WALL
A. The Origins of the Wall—the U-shaped Line in the South China Sea
The foundation for the southern portion of the wall was first laid
when China officially issued a map that claimed the Pratas, Paracel, and
Spratly Islands, as well as the Macclesfield Bank, as part of China.6
Using a U-shaped “eleven-dotted line,” frequently referred to as the
“Cow’s Tongue,” China claimed an area extending south to James Shoal,
4° north latitude.7 Use of the U-shaped eleven-dotted line was initially
reaffirmed by the newly established government of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949, but was subsequently replaced by a nine-

5. See Great Wall History, GREAT WALL OF CHINA, http://www.greatwall-ofchina.com/51-90/the-great-wall-of-china.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
6. Li Jinming & Li Dexia, The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China
Sea: A Note, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 287, 290 (2003).
7. Id. at 289-90.
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dotted line in 1953 after Zhou Enlai authorized the elimination of the
8
two-dotted line portion in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Although it is unclear from the map and subsequent official
statements whether China is claiming the U-shaped line as a maritime
boundary or is simply claiming sovereignty over the land features and
adjacent waters within the line, efforts to reinforce the southern wall
through the enactment of domestic legislation, diplomatic protests, and
threats and coercion have continued over the past sixty years.9 Maps
depicting the U-shaped line appeared most recently in Chinese protests to
Vietnam’s and Malaysia’s extended continental shelf submissions to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2009.10
B. Strengthening the Wall
China reaffirmed its sovereignty over the South China Sea islands
when it declared a twelve nautical mile (nm) territorial sea in 1958.11
12
13
14
Similar assertions were made in 1992, twice in 1996, and in 2009.
8. Id. at 290.
9. Id. at 292-93.
10. See Letter from the People’s Republic of China to the U.N. Secretary-General
Referencing the Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (May 7, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf; see also Letter from the
People’s Republic of China to the U.N. Secretary-General Referencing the Submission
By the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental
Shelf
(May
7,
2009),
available
at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_
vnm.pdf.
11. Resolution of the Approval of the Declaration of the Government on China’s
Territorial Sea (1958) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept.
4, 1958) (China), available at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rotscotnpcotaotdotgocts1338/.
12. Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 25, 1992), art. 2 (1992) (China), available at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/ legis/cen/laws/tsatcz392/.
13. See U.N. Office of Legal Affairs Div. for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea,
Declarations and Statements, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_declarations. htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2012); see also Statement of the
Chinese Government on the Baseline of the Territorial Sea (promulgated by the State
Council, May 15, 1996, effective date May 15, 1996), art. 2 (China), available at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/sotcgotbotts659/.
14. See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Island Protection (decree of the
President of the People’s Republic of China, Dec. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/ law/201001/t20100110_300174.html.
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China asserted its sovereignty over all of the South China Sea islands and
their adjacent waters and continental shelves in two diplomatic protests
15
The first protest was filed after
filed with the United Nations in 2009.
the Philippines enacted Republic Act No. 9522, defining the new
Philippine archipelagic baselines and reasserting Filipino sovereignty
over the Kalayaan Island group and Scarborough Shoal in the South
China Sea.16 The second protest was in response to Vietnam’s
17
18
submission and Vietnam and Malaysia’s joint submission to the
United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, both
claiming extended continental shelves in the South China Sea.
The seawall was further strengthened when China enacted various
laws over the course of a decade: the 1992 Law of the People’s Republic
of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which illegally
claimed security jurisdiction in the contiguous zone;19 the 1998 Law on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which illegally required
foreign warships to give prior notice before transiting the Chinese
territorial sea in innocent passage;20 the 1999 Marine Environment
15. Letter from the People’s Republic of China to the U.N. Secretary-General Referencing
the Republic Act No. 9522 to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines (Apr. 13,
2009),
available
at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/communicationsredeposit/mzn69_2009_chn.pdf; Letter from the
People’s Republic of China Referencing the Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam, supra note 10; Letter from the People’s Republic of China Referencing
the Submission by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, supra note 10.
16. An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by
Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines and For
Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 9522 (2009) (Phil.), available at
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_ 9522_2009.html.
17. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated May 11, 2009, Receipt of Submission Made
by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
vnm37_09/vnm_clcs37_2009e.pdf.
18. U.N. Secretary–General, Letter dated May 7, 2009, Receipt of Joint Submission
Made by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/ mysvnm_clcs33_2009e.pdf.
19. See Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, supra note 12, art. 13. This law violates part II of the UNCLOS, which limits
coastal state jurisdiction in the contiguous zone to customs, fiscal, immigration, or
sanitary laws. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 19 (2)(g), Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
20. Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 12, art. 7. This
law violates part II of UNCLOS, which guarantees the right of innocent passage to all
ships, including warships, without prior notice or consent of the coastal state. See
UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 19, at 404.
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Protection Law, which illegally applied China’s environmental laws to
21
all ships, including warships, in waters under Chinese jurisdiction; and
the 2002 Surveying and Mapping Law, which illegally regulated all
marine data collection, including hydrographic surveys and military data
collection, in waters under Chinese jurisdiction.22 Many of the
provisions of these laws are inconsistent with international law,
exemplifying China’s ongoing lawfare23 strategy to misstate or misapply
international legal norms to accommodate its anti-access strategy.
Finally, in March of 2010, Beijing announced that the South China
Sea was a “core interest” for China, a characterization China had
previously reserved for its most sensitive internal security concerns—
Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.24 Despite the fact that some Chinese
officials are in disagreement about the merits of taking such a strong
25
action, this announcement demonstrated that Beijing no longer sees
room for compromise with the other South China Sea claimants and will
likely resort to force to protect its interests in the region if necessary.
In 1974, capitalizing on Washington’s pre-occupation with the
United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam, China invaded the Paracel
Islands, easily overwhelming the South Vietnamese garrison and
illegally occupying the islands.26 Over the next thirty years, China
21. Marine Environment Protection Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s
Cong.,
Dec.
25,
1999),
art.
2
(China),
available
at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/ meplotproc607/. This law violates many of the
provisions of part XII of UNCLOS, including article 236, which exempts sovereign
immune vessels from compliance with the environmental provisions of the convention.
See UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 236, at 494.
22. Surveying and Mapping Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Aug. 29, 2002), art. 2 (China), available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/
laws/samlotproc 506/. This law violates parts V and XIII of UNCLOS, which distinguish
between coastal state jurisdiction over marine scientific research in the exclusive
economic zone and user state freedoms to engage in other survey/marine data collection
activities in the exclusive economic zone. See UNCLOS, supra note 19, pts. V & XIII.
23. Lawfare is a form of asymmetrical warfare that can be defined as the use or
misuse of international law to attack or condemn an opponent’s position or actions in
order to win a public support. See Charles Dunlap, Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21stCentury Conflicts?, 54 JOINT FORCES Q., 34, 35 (2009), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA515192.
24. Peter Lee, US Goes Fishing for Trouble, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, July 29, 2010,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG29Ad02.html.
25. Edward Wong, China Hedges Over Whether South China Sea is a ‘Core Interest’
Worth War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/asia/
31beijing.html.
26. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS – SOUTH
CHINA SEA 2 (2008), available at http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/South_China_Sea/
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dramatically increased its military presence in the Paracels, constructing
a large military airfield on Woody Island and an intelligence monitoring
facility on an adjacent island that would serve as forward operating bases
27
for combat operations in the South China Sea. In 1988, another clash
between China and Vietnam at Johnson South Reef resulted in the
sinking of several Vietnamese ships and the death of seventy Vietnamese
sailors.28 Following this engagement, China occupied six additional key
29
In 1995, China secretly occupied
islets in the Spratly archipelago.
Mischief Reef,30 an islet located within the Philippine exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), 130 miles from Palawan Island, and strategically
situated astride one of Asia’s most important sea lanes—the Palawan
Strait.31 China’s presence on the reef gave it the ability to disrupt
maritime traffic transiting the Malacca and Singapore straits to the
Philippines and northern Asia. Despite Filipino protest calling for
China’s withdrawal from the islet, China has continued its illegal
military build-up of the reef since 1999.32
As another means of projecting power in the South China Sea, China
33
Press reports
continues to improve its naval base on Hainan Island.
have also indicated that China intends to deploy its new anti-ship
ballistic missile (DF-21D “carrier killer”), currently in production, at a
new military base in Guangdong Province. 34 With a reported range of
pdf.pdf; Eleanor Duckwall, China’s Naval Buildup – Mischief Reef and More, ELEANOR
DUCKWALL’S SPOTLIGHT (July 7, 2009), http://sixthcolumn.typepad.com/duckwalls/2009/
07/chinas-naval-buildup-mischief-reef-and-more.html; ICE Case Studies, Spartly Island
Dispute, TRADE & ENV’T DATABASE (1997), http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/
spratly.htm (last visited June 21, 2012); Le Duc, History of Chinese Imperialism in
Vietnam: From Viet Nam to Paracel/Spratly, PARACEL & SPRATLY ISLAND FORUM,
http://paracelspratlyislands.blogspot.com/2008/01/history-of-chinese-imperialism-in.html
(last visited June 21, 2012).
27. Andrei Chang, Analysis: China’s Air-Sea Buildup, SPACE WAR (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Analysis_Chinas_air-sea_buildup_999.html.
28. Military Clashes in the South China Sea, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-clash.htm (last modified Nov.
7, 2011).
29. See Duckwell, supra note 26; ICE Cast Studies, supra note 26.
30. See Duckwell, supra note 26.
31. Id.
32. David G. Wiencek, South China Sea Flashpoint, CHINA BRIEF, Dec. 31, 2001,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3735&tx_
ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=191&no_cache=1.
33. See Duckwell, supra note 26.
34. Wendall Minnick, China Builds First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Base?, DEF.
NEWS, Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100805/DEFSECT01/
8050301/China-Builds-First-Anti-Ship-Ballistic-Missile-Base-.
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up to 2,000 kilometers, the DF-21D would be able to cover most of the
35
Spratly Islands.
Chinese aggression against Vietnam has continued unabated in the
twenty-first century. For example, in January 2005, Chinese naval
vessels fired on Vietnamese fishing boats in Vietnam’s territorial sea,
killing nine and injuring seven others.36 China justified its actions as
acts of self-defense against armed pirates.37 Similar incidents have
continued over the past several years, culminating in 2009 with the
seizure of 33 Vietnamese fishing vessels and 433 crew members in the
South China Sea.38 Additionally, in April 2010, China issued a unilateral
fishing ban for the South China Sea in an effort to assert control over the
region’s depleted fish stocks and seized a Vietnamese fishing boat and its
crew in the vicinity of the Paracels.39 Five months later, China seized a
second Vietnamese fishing vessel and its crew for allegedly fishing with
40
Despite Hanoi’s repeated calls for immediate and
explosives.
unconditional release of the vessel and its 9 crew members, China did
41
not release the crew until the 12th of October. The most recent spat
occurred in March 2012, after China detained 2 Vietnamese fishing boats
and their crews near the Paracels.42 Hanoi has called for the immediate
and unconditional release of the two boats and their twenty-one
crewmembers, refusing to pay the 70,000 yuan fee and demanding that
Beijing stop hindering Vietnamese fishermen in the South China Sea.43
Interestingly enough, Beijing’s reaction during these incidents is
completely inconsistent with its position following the September 7,
35. Id.
36. Thi Q. Lam, Latest Gulf of Tonkin Incident Reveal’s China’s Imperialist Designs,
PACIFIC NEWS SERV., Feb. 13, 2005, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/
view_article.html? article_id=48b8f8c62035 29cbd50b4ca149abeac4#.
37. Id.
38. China Seizes Vietnamese Fishing Boat, ASIA-PACIFIC NEWS, Apr. 19, 2010,
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/asiapacific/news/article_1549166.php/Chinaseizes-Vietnamese-fishing-boat.
39. Id.
40. After Senkaku Dispute, China-Vietnam Crisis Looms in South China Sea, ASIA
NEWS, Oct. 6, 2010, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/After-Senkaku-dispute,-ChinaVietnam-crisis-looms-in-South-China-Sea-19651.html#.
41. China Claims Release of fishermen Who Remain at Large, VIETNAM TODAY, Oct.
16, 2010, http://www.dztimes.net/post/social/china-claims-release-of-fishermen-whoremain-at-large.aspx.
42. Vietnam, China in New Spat Over Fishermen Detentions, YAHOO!NEWS.COM,
Mar. 22, 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/vietnam-china-spat-over-fishermen-detentions160611101.html.
43. Id.
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2010 arrest of the Chinese trawler captain by Japanese authorities in the
44
Following the captain’s arrest, Chinese
vicinity of the Senkakus.
authorities demanded the immediate release of the captain and his boat
claiming that Japan had infringed on China’s territorial sovereignty and
violated the captain’s human rights.45
China has also resorted to economic coercion by threatening U.S.
and international oil and gas companies, including Exxon/Mobil in 2008
and BP in 2007, with loss of business opportunities in mainland China if
they did not stop joint exploration ventures with Vietnam in the South
China Sea.46 Most recently, in March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats
harassed a Philippine Department of Energy vessel—the M/V Veritas
Voyager—that was conducting a seismic survey for oil and gas in the
vicinity of Reed Bank, ordering the vessel to leave the area.47 The
Chinese patrols boats departed the area after Manila dispatched an OV10 Bronco bomber and a navy reconnaissance plane to investigate the
incident and deter further Chinese aggression.48 Manila lodged a strong
diplomatic protest with Beijing over the incident and indicated that it
would upgrade the military airfield on Pag-asa (Thitu) and acquire new
patrol ships, aircraft, and radars to better defend its South China Sea
49
The survey was completed at the end of March with the
claims.
assistance of a Philippine Coast Guard vessel that was deployed to the
area to deter further Chinese interference with the Voyager’s work.50
The Reed Bank oil and gas fields are located well within the Philippine-

44. See Martin Fackler & Ian Johnson, Japan Retreats With Release of Chinese Boat
Captain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/
world/asia/25chinajapan.html?pagewanted=all.
45. Id.
46. Jason Folkmanis, China Warms Some Oil Companies on Work with Vietnam, U.S. Says,
BLOOMBERG, July 16, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=20670001&sid
=ak.1QfnkDStU; Peter Navarro, China Stirs Over Offshore Oil Pact, ASIA TIMES, July 23,
2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html; U.S. Sees No Recent China Pressure on
Global Oil Companies in South Sea, Bloomberg, Aug. 17, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-08-18/u-s-sees-no-recent-china-pressure-on-global-oil-companies-in-south-sea.html.
47. Jamie Laude, AFP to Maintain Presence in Spratlys, PHILIPPINE STAR, Mar. 29,
2011,
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=670842&publicationSubCategoryId=.
48. Id.
49. Philippines to Bolster Watch in Disputed Spratlys, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 28, 2011,
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9M89S6G1.htm.
50. Id; Florantes S. Solmerin, Military to Install Radars on Nine Spratly Islands,
MANILA STANDARD TODAY, Mar. 8, 2011, http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/
insidenews.htm?f=2011/march/8/news1.isx&d=2011/march/8.
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51
The
claimed EEZ, approximately 80 nm west of Palawan Island.
events off of Palawan were repeated in May 2011 off the coast of
Vietnam when China Marine Surveillance vessels cut the exploration
cable of the Binh Minh 02, a survey ship being operated by Petro
52
Vietnam. The ship was approximately 116 nm off Dai Lanh, which is
well within Vietnam’s claimed EEZ.53 Two weeks later, on June 9,
2011, a Chinese fishing vessel that was operating with two China
Maritime Surveillance patrol vessels intentionally rammed the survey
cable of the Viking 2, which was conducting a seismic survey
approximately 60 nm off the southern coast of Vietnam well within
Vietnam’s EEZ and over 1,000 km from Hainan Island.54 However,
Chinese aggression has not been limited to Vietnam. Admiral Willard,
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, testified before Congress in
January of 2010 as to China’s increased aggressiveness, stating that
“[t]he [People’s Liberation Army (PLA)] Navy has increased its patrols
throughout the [South China Sea] region and has shown an increased
willingness to confront regional nations on the high seas and within the
contested island chains.”55 In March of 2010, six PLA ships conducted a
training exercise in the vicinity of Fiery Cross Reef.56 A month later,
China began escorting its fishing vessels in the contested area after a
Malaysian warship allegedly removed the cover of its gun mount and
shadowed Chinese fishing vessels that were operating near Layang
57
Finally, China reasserted its
Island in the Spratly archipelago.
“indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea by conducting an
unprecedented military exercise involving ships and aircraft from all

51. Scott Weeden, Palawan Gas Development Sparks Chinese Protest, E&P, Nov. 14,
2011, http://www.epmag.com/Production-Drilling/Palawan-Gas-Development-SparksChinese-Protest_91573#.
52. VN Demands China Stop Sovereignty Violations, VIETNAM PLUS, May 29, 2011,
http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/VN-demands-China-stop-sovereigntyviolations/20115/18615.v
nplus.
53. Id.
54. See Sea Spat Raises China-Vietnam tensions, NAMVIET NEWS, June 10, 2011,
http://namvietnews.wordpress.com/2011/06/10/sea-spat-raises-china-vietnam-tensions/.
55. U.S. Pacific Command: Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee
on U.S. Pacific Command Posture (Mar. 23, 2010) (Statement of Admiral Robert F.
Willard, U.S. Navy, Commander), available at http://www.pacom.mil/web/
pacom_resources/pdf/willard_statement _HASC_032510.pdf.
56. Brian Cross, The Spratly and Paracel Islands: Issues in the South China Sea,
SUITE101.COM, June 7, 2010, http://news.suite101.com/article.cfm/the-spratly-andparacel-islands-issues-in-the-south-china-sea-a245756.
57. Koichi Furuya et al., China Ratcheting up Regional Tension, ASAHI SHIMBUN,
July 24, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201007230527.html.
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three of its fleets, in response to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s
statement before a July 2010 meeting of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum that “[t]he United States, like
every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open
access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in
the South China Sea” and that “[t]he United States supports a
collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the
58
various territorial disputes without coercion.”
Further, Chinese ships and aircraft routinely harass and interfere with
U.S. military ships and aircraft conducting lawful activities in and over
China’s EEZ in the South China Sea. Although there have been
countless confrontations between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft at
sea, the two most notable incidents receiving extensive media coverage
were the EP-3 incident in 2001 and the Impeccable incident in 2009.
On April 1, 2001, two Chinese F-8 fighter aircrafts intercepted a U.S.
EP-3 that had been conducting a routine reconnaissance flight about
seventy miles southeast of Hainan Island.59 While making a close
approach to the EP-3, one of the F-8s lost control and collided with the
EP-3, forcing the U.S. aircraft to make an emergency landing at the
Lingshui military airfield on Hainan.60 The crew was detained by the
PLA for eleven days before being released and the aircraft was not
returned until July 2001.61 In March 2009, five Chinese vessels—three
government ships and two small cargo ships—harassed the Impeccable
(T-AGOS 23) while the vessel was engaged in lawful military activities
in the South China Sea approximately 75 nm from Hainan Island.62 The
cargo ships intentionally stopped in front of the Impeccable, forcing the
63
U.S. ship to make an emergency all-stop to avoid a collision. It is clear
58. Greg Torode & Minnie Chan, For China, War Games are Steel Behind the
Statements, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, July 31, 2010, http://vietstudies.info/kinhte/China_war_games.htm;
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: On Her Way Back to the States, FREEDOM’S CHOICE
BLOG, (July 23, 2010), http://secretaryclinton.wordpress.com/2010/07/23/secretary-ofstate-hillary-clinton-on-her-way-back-to-the-states/.
59. SHIRLEY A. KAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30946, CHINA-U.S. AIRCRAFT
COLLISION INCIDENT OF APRIL 2001: ASSESSMENTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1 (2010),
available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1, 8.
62. Ann Scott Tyson, China Draws U.S. Protest Over Shadowing of Ships, WASH.
POST, Mar. 10, 2009, at A8.
63. See Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable – Raw Video #3, YOUTUBE, (Mar.
20, 2009), http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x8qapt_chinese-ships-approach-usnsimpecca_news.
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from the video tape of the incident that the cargo ships were acting as
proxies for the Chinese government vessels. What is more, in June 2009,
a Chinese submarine collided with the USS John S. McCain’s (DDG 56)
as it was towing sonar array off the Philippine coast approximately 144
64
It is unknown whether the collision
nautical miles from Subic Bay.
was intentional or just another example of poor seamanship by the PLA.
Many of the above actions took place after China agreed to abide by
the 2002 Joint Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
which requires the various claimants to “undertake to resolve their
territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without
resorting to the threat or the use of force.”65 There is little evidence that
China had any intention of abiding by the declaration, but rather, it seems
China used the declaration to buy time to strengthen its existing outposts,
as well as occupy further features in the South China Sea.66
C. The Eastern Portion of the Wall—the East China Sea
The foundation for the eastern bastions was laid in 1958 with the
Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
of the Approval of the Declaration of the Government of China’s
Territorial Sea, where article 1 identified Taiwan as Chinese territory.67
The wall was significantly strengthened in 1972 with adoption of the
“One-China” policy by the United States, confirmed in 1978 and 1982,
which recognized Beijing as the legitimate government of China.68
64. Barbara Starr, Sub Collides with Sonar Array Towed by U.S. Navy Ship, CNN.COM,
June 12, 2009, www.cnn.com/2009/US/06/12/china.submarine/.
65. Assoc. of Southeast Asian Nations, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea (Nov. 4, 2002), http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm.
66. See, e.g., Kenji Minemura, China’s Scenario to Seize Isles in South China Sea,
CHINA MILITARY NEWS, Jan. 1, 2011, http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/chinasscenario-to-seize-isles-in-south-china-sea.html (discussing the PLA’s internal tactical
plan to seize control of the South China Sea islands that are currently occupied by other
claimants).
67. Resolution of the Approval of the Declaration of the Government on China’s
Territorial Sea, supra note 11.
68. Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of
China, Feb. 28, 1972, TAIWAN DOCUMENTS PROJECT, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/
communique01.htm (last visited June 12, 2012); Joint Communiqué of the United States
of America and the People’s Republic of China, Jan 15, 1978, Establishment of
Diplomatic Relations, U.S. & China, TAIWAN DOCUMENTS PROJECT,
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/ communique02.htm (last visited June 12, 2012); Joint
Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, Aug.
17, 1982, Arms Sales to Taiwan, U.S. & China, TAIWAN DOCUMENTS PROJECT,
http://www.taiwan documents.org/communique03.htm (last visited June 12, 2012).
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China re-affirmed its claim to Taiwan in article 2 of the 1992 Law of the
People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
69
Zone. And in 1998, China fortified the wall by enacting the Law on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of China,
which illegally provides in article 13 that “China may enact laws and
regulations relating to transit passage of foreign vessels and aircraft”
through the Taiwan Strait.70 This law violates the law of the sea,
reflected in article 36 of UNCLOS, which guarantees freedom of
71
navigation through straits that contain a high seas or EEZ corridor.
In 1995 and 1996, China took further steps to strengthen the eastern
seawall around Taiwan by conducting a series of military exercises off
the Taiwanese coast in an effort to dissuade the Kuomintang party’s
independence movement, designed to influence the March 1996
presidential election.72 From July 21 28, 1995, the PLA conducted a
series of exercises off the coast of Taiwan, including the launching of six
surface-to-surface missiles that landed within 100 miles of Taiwan.73
There was no visible United States response to the exercises. Although
the USS Nimitz transited the Taiwan Strait in December 1995, the first
transit of a U.S. carrier since 1979, in actuality the ship was diverted
through the strait due to bad weather, not as a show of support for
Taiwan.74 In March 1996, the PLA conducted a second and more
aggressive round of exercises; surface-to-surface missiles were again
fired off the coast of Taiwan, some of which impacted within twenty
miles of the northern port of Keelung.75 U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry
suggested deploying a carrier battle group to the Taiwan Strait as a
76
Unfortunately, he was overruled by the National Security
deterrent.
Council and, instead, the Administration ordered two carrier battle
69. Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 12.
70. Id. This provision violates part III of UNCLOS, which provides in article 36 that
high seas freedoms of navigation and over-flight (not the more restrictive transit passage
regime) apply in straits that have a high seas or EEZ corridor. See UNCLOS, supra note
19, art. 36, at 410.
71. See UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 36, at 410.
72. Kristie Wang, Chronology of Recent Events in U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-China
Relations, CTR. FOR TAIWAN INT’L REL., http://www.taiwandc.org/hst-9596.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2012).
73. Id. See also Michael Richardson, Chinese Missile Tests Seen as Intimidation, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/21/news/21ihtchina_9.html?scp=1&sq=Michael
%20richardson,%20Chinese%20Missile%20tests%20seen%20as%20intimidation&st=cse.
74. Robert S. Ross, The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion,
Credibility, and Use of Force, 25 INT’L SECURITY 87, 104 (2000).
75. Id. at 107.
76. Id. at 110.
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groups—the Independence and Nimitz—to the region to observe the PLA
77
Although the U.S. carrier presence provided a temporary
exercises.
deterrent to China, the ships remained outside the strait, and as a result,
the wall inched higher.78
The extension of the wall to the northeast began in earnest in the
1970s when the dispute between Japan and China over ownership of the
Senkaku Islands took on a new dimension after a 1969 report by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
indicated the possibility of large oil and gas reserves in the vicinity of the
islands.79 Despite having returned the islands to Japanese administrative
80
control in 1971 under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, U.S. ambivalence
over the underlying sovereignty claims emboldened China to re-assert
ownership over the Senkakus and claim an extended continental shelf to
the limits of the Okinawa Trough.81 For example, when submitting the
Okinawa Reversion Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, the
Department of State specifically indicated that reversion of the Senkakus
to Japanese administrative control did not prejudice the underlying
sovereignty claims to the islands.82 Subsequent Administrations have
retained this neutral stance.83 In short, despite acknowledging that the
84
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applied to the Senkakus, the United States
has done little to support its treaty ally on this important and sensitive
issue.85
Chinese incursions into the waters around the Senkakus significantly
increased in number, as well as intensity, after Japan declared an EEZ
77. Id.
78. Id. at 118.
79. Senkaku/Diaoyutai
Islands,
GLOBAL
SECURITY
(Aug.
6,
2010),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm.
80. Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, U.S.–Jap., June 17, 1971, RYUKYU-OKINAWA
HISTORY & CULTURE, http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/ archive/rev71.html (last
visited June 12, 2012).
81. Daniel Dzurek, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute (Oct. 18, 1996), wwwibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/docs/senkaku.html#note4; Thomas R. Ragland, A Harbinger:
The Senkaku Islands, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 664, 668-69 (1973).
82. LARRY A. NIKSCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-798, SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS
DISPUTE: THE U.S. LEGAL RELATIONSHIP AND OBLIGATIONS 3 (1996), available at
http://assets.opencrs .com/rpts/96-798_19960930.pdf.
83. Id. at 4.
84. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States
of America, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/q&a/ref/1.html (last visited June 22, 2012).
85. NIKSCH, supra note 82, at 4.
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86
For example, between 2003 and 2004, the
around the islands in 1996.
number of incursions into Japanese waters by Chinese naval and other
87
Chinese
government vessels jumped from six to thirty-four.
88
aggressiveness has likewise increased. For instance, in April of 2010, a
PLA helicopter buzzed a Japanese surveillance vessel, which had been
monitoring Chinese military exercises in waters off Okinawa, coming
within ninety meters of the Japanese ship.89 Similarly, in May of 2010, a
Japanese oceanographic survey vessel, Shoyo, was pursued by a Chinese
inspection ship, Haijian 51, and ordered to leave “Chinese waters” about
198 miles northwest of Amani Oshima Island.90
Japan-China relations dipped to an all-time low following an incident
in September 2010 between a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese
patrol vessels.91 Following several high-level demands and threats of
strong countermeasures if the captain was not unconditionally released,
Tokyo ultimately succumbed and released the captain, who had been
held for two weeks.92 Citing diplomatic considerations, Japanese
prosecutors suspended investigation of the charges—obstructing officials
93
on duty—which it had initially brought against the captain. Although
Japan’s decision to confront Chinese aggression was admirable, it failed
to achieve its intended purpose when Tokyo gave in to Chinese
demands.94 Unfortunately, despite assurances by Secretary of State

86. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: the Right to
Conduct Military Activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 11 CHINESE J. INT’L L.
9, 16-18 (2010); NIKSCH, supra note 82, at 4. See also James J. Przystup, Japan-China
Relations: Not The Best of Times, 6 COMP. CONNECTIONS 117, 119 (2004), available at
http://csis.org/publication/comparative-connections-v6-n3-japan-china-relations-not-besttimes; John J. Tkacik, Jr., China’s New Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION
(July
13,
2004),
http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/wm533.cfm.
87. Peter A. Dutton, International Law and the November 2004 “Han Incident”, 2
ASIAN SECURITY 87, 96 (2006).
88. Dutton, supra note 86; Tkacik, supra note 86.
89. Malcolm Foster, Japan, China Test Each Other’s Diplomatic Resolve, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/sep/27/japan-chinatest-each-others-diplomatic-resolve/.
90. Japan Protests To Beijing Over Chasing in East China Sea, NEWS352, Apr. 5,
2010, http://hello.news352.lu/edito-39130-japan-protests-to-beijing-over-chasing-in-eastchina-sea.html?p=movies.
91. Martin Fackler, Japan Retreats with Release of Chinese Boat Captain, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/world/asia/25chinajapan.
html.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
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Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates that article 5 of the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty applied to the Senkakus, there was little in the way of
95
actual U.S. support for Japan during this incident.
D. The Northern Portion of the Wall—Gulf of Bo Hai
and the Yellow Sea
The initial bricks for the northern wall were also laid in 1958. article
2 of the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of
China identified the waters of the Bohai Bay as Chinese inland waters.96
In 2001, the wall was extended seaward when a PLA Jianheu III-class
frigate aggressively confronted the Bowditch (T-AGS 62), which was
legally conducting a routine military survey in the Yellow Sea. 97 The
unarmed hydrographic survey ship was ordered to leave the Chinese EEZ
98
or suffer the consequences. Being an unarmed auxiliary, the Bowditch
complied with the order, but returned several days later with a naval
99
escort to complete its mission.
Eight years later, Chinese vessels once again harassed a U.S. ship
that was conducting routine surveillance operations in the Yellow Sea.100
In May of 2009, two Chinese fishing vessels came within ninety feet of
the Victorious (T-AGOS-19), prompting the unarmed ship to use its
water hose to ward off the Chinese boats.101 As in the earlier case of the
Impeccable, video tapes of the Victorious incident clearly demonstrate
102
that the Chinese trawlers were acting as proxies for the PLA Navy.
The wall was extended further east and north in July 2010, after
China voiced strong objections to the planned deployment of the George
Washington (CVN 73) to the Yellow Sea, where it was to conduct a joint

95. Japan, U.S. Affirm Cooperation on Disputed Senkaku Islands, JAPAN TIMES, Oct.
12, 2010, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20101012a4.html.
96. Resolution of the Approval of the Declaration of the Government on China’s
Territorial Sea, supra note 11.
97. Chris Plante, U.S. Quietly Resumes Surveillance Flights Off China, CNN.COM,
May 15, 2001, http://www.articles.cnn.com/2001-05-15/us/us.china.plane_1_transportplane-navy-ep-3-chinese-coast?_s=PM:us; KAN, supra note 59, at 14.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Pentagon Reports Naval Incident in Yellow Sea, VOICE OF AMERICA, May 5, 2009,
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-05-voa24-68787162.html.
101. Id.
102. For an account of the incident, see Barbara Starr, Chinese Boats Harassed U.S.
Ship, Officials Say, CNN.COM, (May 5, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/
asiapcf/05/05/china.maritime.harassment/.
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103

After it was announced in
military exercise with South Korean forces.
July 2010 that the U.S. aircraft carrier would participate in “Invincible
Spirit,” a joint U.S.-South Korea exercise intended to send a message to
North Korea for its alleged sinking of the South Korean warship
Cheonan earlier that year, China voiced strong objections to the presence
of the carrier in the Yellow Sea, indicating that deploying the carrier to
the Yellow Sea would be seen as provocative and a threat to Chinese
national security, even though the U.S. carrier had conducted operations
in the Yellow Sea earlier in the year without incident.104 Despite
statements from the Pentagon that the United States reserved the right to
operate in the Yellow Sea, the carrier was ultimately deployed east of the
Korean peninsula in an apparent effort to appease China’s concerns.105
Rather than acknowledge the U.S. gesture, Beijing responded to the
decision to keep the carrier east of the Korean peninsula with a live-fire
naval exercise of its own in the East China Sea from June 30 to July 5.106
The northern wall was further strengthened in August 2010 when the
United Nations Command in Seoul announced that the George
Washington would not participate in “Ulchi Freedom Guardian,” a
second joint exercise with South Korea in mid-August, despite
statements by the Pentagon in early August that the George Washington
would take part in a sequence of exercises with South Korea, “including
exercising in the Yellow Sea.”107 China responded to these U.S. press
statements by announcing that the PLA Navy would conduct a live-fire
108
On August 31 of that year, the United
exercise in the Yellow Sea.
103. See Christopher Bodeen, USS George Washington Visit Poses a Dilemma for China,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 26, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/ 26/uss-georgewashington-vis_n_788671.html; see also Al Peesin, US Aircraft Carrier to Exercise in Yellow
Sea, VOICE OF AMERICA, Aug. 5, 2010, www.voanews.com/ english/news/usa/us-aircraftcarrier-to-exercise-in-yellow-sea-100061074.html; see generally John Hemmings, Cheonan
ASIAN
FORUM
(Aug.
19,
2010),
Raises
Tensions
with
China,
E.
http://www.eastasiaforum.rog/2010/ 08/19/cheonan-raises-tensions-with-china/; Jim Garamone,
U.S. Korean Defense Leaders Announce Exercise Invincible Spirit, DEP’T OF DEF. (July 20,
2010), http://www.defense. gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60074.
104. See Peter J. Brown, China’s Pro-Missile Navy Sinks Carriers, ASIA TIMES, July
23, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/LG23Ad01.html.
105. Bill Gert, Inside the Ring: Chinese Carrier Pressure, WASHI. TIMES, July 21, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/21/inside-the-ring-300362848/?page=all.
106. John Chan, US Naval Exercise Heightens Tensions in Asia, WORLD SOCIALIST
WEB SITE, July 24 2010, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/jul2010/kore-j24.shtml.
107. Dep’t of Def. News Briefing with Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary (Aug.
5, 2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
53001.
108. Gillian Wong, Chinese Navy to Hold Drills in Yellow Sea, YAHOO NEWS, Aug. 29,
2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100829/ap_on_re_as/as_china_naval_drills.
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States announced, yet again, that the George Washington would not take
part in an anti-submarine exercise in the Yellow Sea that had been
109
Finally, in late November
planned to take place from September 5-9.
of 2010, the George Washington deployed to the Yellow Sea to conduct
110
However, the
a joint exercise with the South Korean Navy.
deployment was pre-announced by the U.S. administration and was the
subject of a Chinese diplomatic protest well in advance of the
exercise.111 In short, as was the case with the lack of U.S. carrier
presence in the Taiwan Strait during the 1990s, every day that passes
without a routine unannounced U.S. carrier presence in the Yellow Sea
adds another brick to the northern wall.
E. The Inner Defensive Wall—China’s Straight Baseline Claims
Anticipating that the outer wall may someday be breached, China has
also constructed an inner defensive wall along its entire coastline. The
initial foundation for the inner defenses was laid in 1958.112 Article 2 of
the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on
China’s Territorial Sea indicated that the territorial sea would be
measured from baselines “composed of straight lines connecting bas
[sic]-points on the mainland coast and on the outermost coastal islands,”
and that all waters landward of the baselines, as well as all of the islands
inside the baselines (including Tungyin Island, Kaoteng Island, the
Matsu Islands, the Paichuan Islands, Wuchiu Island, the Greater and
Lesser Quemoy Islands, Tatan Island, Erhtan Island, and the Tungting
Islands), were considered internal waters.113 Article 3 of the 1992 Law
of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone likewise indicated that the territorial sea would be

109. S. Korea and US to Stage Joint Naval Drill, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 31, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j3rg8MRGsoEnYyexjijpvcz36aww.
110. Brandon Place, USS George Washington Headed for the Yellow Sea,
SUITE101.COM, Nov. 26, 2010, http://www.suite101.com/content/uss-george-washingtonheading-for-yellow-sea-a313179.
111. Id. See also Jeremy Page, China Warns U.S. as Korea Tensions Rise, WALL ST. J., Nov.
26, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704008704575638420698918004.
html.
112. See Resolution of the Approval of the Declaration of the Government on China’s
Territorial Sea, supra note 11.
113. Id.
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measured twelve nautical miles out from straight baselines along the
114
coast, but did not define the base points.
China solidified its straight baseline claims in 1996 with the
Statement of the Chinese Government on the Baseline of the Territorial
Sea, which identified forty-nine base points along mainland China and
twenty-eight base points around the Xisha Islands.115 However, most of
the Chinese coast does not meet the geographic conditions articulated in
116
the UNCLOS for applying straight baselines.
The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is
the low-water line.117 Straight baselines may only be used where the
coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands
118
China’s straight baseline
along the coast in its immediate vicinity.
claims are therefore illegal under international law.119 Although the
United States has diplomatically protested China’s claim, it has been
nearly fifteen years since the U.S. Navy has operationally challenged the
illegal baselines under the Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program.120
III. MORE “WORDS” FROM THE UNITED STATES
There is an old Chinese Proverb which states that “talk doesn’t cook
rice.”121 Domestic laws, diplomatic protest, and sovereignty claims are
meaningless unless backed with some level of implementation. When
words have been insufficient to adequately advance China’s interest,
Beijing has not been reluctant to use force and coercion to advance its
position (e.g., the 1974 invasion of the Paracels, the 1988 skirmish with
Vietnam off Johnson South Reef, the 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef,
interference with Vietnamese and Filipino survey vessels and fishing

114. U.N. Office of Legal Affairs Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, supra
note 13.
115. Statement of the Chinese Government on the Baseline of the Territorial Sea,
supra note 13.
116. UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 7, at 401.
117. Id. art. 5, at 400.
118. Id. art. 7, at 400.
119. OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF OCEANS & INTL. ENVTL. & SCIENTIFIC
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 117 STRAIGHT BASELINE CLAIM:
CHINA 3-4 (1996), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57692.pdf.
120. DEP’T OF DEF., MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, CHINA, PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA SUMMARY OF CLAIMS 126 (2008), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/20051m.htm.
121. Food
Quotations
Chinese
Philosophers/Proverbs,
ABOUT.COM,
http://chinesefood.about.com/library/blquotationsch.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
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122
Unfortunately, the United States
boats in their respective EEZs, etc.).
has normally been slow to respond to Chinese imperialism at sea over the
past forty years. However, in 2010, several U.S. officials unexpectedly
engaged in a new war of words with China over its illegal claims in the
123
This begs the question: is the United States ready to
South China Sea.
match words with action?
Following China’s announcement in March 2010 that the South
China Sea was now a “core interest” for China, Defense Secretary Robert
Gates responded by stating that the South China Sea was an “area of
growing concern” for the United States.124 Addressing the annual
meeting of defense ministers in Singapore (Shangri-La Dialogue) in June
2010, Secretary Gates indicated, inter alia, that it was a longstanding
policy of the United States to defend freedom of navigation and that the
125
He further emphasized that the
United States would continue to do so.
South China Sea was “not only vital to those directly bordering it, but to
all nations with economic and security interests in Asia” and that U.S.
policy was clear:

[I]t is essential that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and
unhindered economic development be maintained. We do not
take sides on any competing sovereignty claims, but we do
oppose the use of force and actions that hinder freedom of
navigation. We object to any effort to intimidate U.S.
corporations or those of any nation engaged in legitimate
economic activity. All parties must work together to resolve
differences through peaceful, multilateral efforts consistent with
customary international law. The 2002 Declaration of Conduct
was an important step in this direction, and we hope that
concrete implementation of this agreement will continue.126
A month later at the annual meeting of the ARF in Vietnam,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also took the opportunity to reemphasize the importance of the South China Sea to the United States,
indicating that the “United States, like every nation, has a national
interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime

122. See supra Part II.
123. See e.g., Secretary of Def. Robert M. Gates, Remarks at the Shangri-La Hotel,
Singapore (June 5, 2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid =1483.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.”
She further elaborated that the United States supported a “collaborative
diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial
disputes without coercion,” and that the United States opposed “the use
128
She re-emphasized U.S. neutrality
or threat of force by any claimant.”
on the sovereignty issue, indicating that “the United States does not take
sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South
China Sea.”129 However, she stressed that the “claimants should pursue
their territorial claims and the company and rights to maritime space in
accordance with [UNCLOS]” and that, “[c]onsistent with customary
international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China
Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.” 130
She finally expressed support for the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and encouraged “the
parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct,” offering U.S.
assistance “to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures
consistent with the declaration.”131 She concluded by stating that “it is in
the interest of all claimants and the broader international community for
unimpeded commerce to proceed under lawful conditions” and
suggesting the importance of “[r]espect for the interests of the
international community and responsible efforts to address these
unresolved claims [to] help create the conditions for resolution of the
disputes and a lowering of regional tensions.”132
These statements, although welcomed, are really not that different
from the position the United States has been articulating for the South
China Sea since the mid-1990s. In a statement issued by the State
Department in May 1995, the United States made similar statements:
The United States is concerned that a pattern of unilateral actions
and reactions in the South China Sea has increased tensions in
that region. The United States strongly opposes the use or threat
of force to resolve competing claims and urges all claimants to
exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing actions.
The United States has an abiding interest in the maintenance of
peace and stability in the South China Sea. The United States
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: On Her Way Back to the States, supra note 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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calls upon claimants to intensify diplomatic efforts which
address issues related to the competing claims, taking into
account the interests of all parties, and which contribute to peace
and prosperity in the region. The United States is willing to assist
in any way that the claimants deem helpful. The United States
reaffirms its welcome of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the
South China Sea.
Maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of
the United States. Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft
in the South China Sea is essential for the peace and prosperity
of the entire Asia-Pacific region, including the United States.
The United States takes no position on the legal merits of the
competing claims to sovereignty over the various island, reefs,
atolls, and cays in the South China Sea. The United States
would, however, view with serious concern any maritime claim
or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that
was not consistent with international law, including the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.133
Similarly, on June 16, 1995, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security, Joseph Nye, stated in Tokyo that "[i]f military
action occurred in the Spratlys and this interfered with the freedom of the
seas, then we would be prepared to escort and make sure that navigation
continues."134 In addition, a Pentagon study conducted in the same year
re-affirmed U.S. neutrality on the sovereignty issue, but also indicated
that the United States had a “strategic interest in maintaining the lines of
communication linking South-East Asia, North-East Asia and the Indian
Ocean” and that the United States would “resist any maritime claims
beyond those permitted by the Law of the Sea Convention."135 The only
real difference between the 1995 and 2010 positions is the reference to
the 2002 declaration, but, of course, the 2002 declaration was not in
existence in 1995. Additionally, the specific reference to multilateral

133. Christine Shelly, U.S. Dep’t of State Daily Press Briefing (May 10, 1995),
available
at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9505/950510db.html.
134. Bahukutumbi Raman, Re-Visiting the South China Sea, Paper No. 222, SOUTH
ASIA ANALYSIS GRP. (Apr. 3, 2001), http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5
Cpapers3%5Cpaper 222.htm.
135. Id.
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discussions and the offer to act as a mediator to the dispute is also a new
development and is a strong position going forward.
IV. IS THE WALL IMPREGNABLE?
Like all of China’s previous walls, the seawall can be breeched.
However, it will take a concerted effort on the part of the United States
and its international partners to do so. Those who believe appeasement
is the answer and that China will react as a responsible state actor are
seriously misplaced. Having sat across the table from Chinese
counterparts during numerous negotiations, including at the International
Maritime Organization, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement,
and the United Nations Office at Vienna, my experiences suggest that
China does not respect appeasement. On the contrary, Beijing sees
weakness as an opening to be exploited. In short, China only respects
power, not concessions.
Not only is appeasement counterproductive, it undercuts the naval
power and capabilities of the United States. As Senator Webb correctly
observed in 2009, “only [the] United States has both the stature and the
national power to confront the obvious imbalance of power that China
brings to [the South China Sea dispute.]”136 Senator Webb also correctly
stated that, based on previous U.S. reactions to events in the South China
Sea, “it appears the United States is responding to maritime incidents as
singular tactical challenges, while China appears to be acting with a
strategic vision.”137 In short, the United States has been disengaged in
the South China Sea since the 1960s, choosing instead to remain neutral
with regard to the various conflicting sovereignty claims, while at the
same time stressing the importance of freedom of navigation throughout
this strategic waterway. Until recently, the U.S. response to China’s
aggression in the South China Sea has been feeble at best, resulting in
steady reinforcement of the southern portion of China’s seawall for a
period lasting over sixty years.
After Secretary Clinton’s recent statements at the ARF,138 the United
States has an opportunity to end its long-storied ambivalence and take a
more active approach to countering Chinese dominance in the South
136. Press Release, Sen. Jim Webb, Senate Hearing on Maritime & Sovereignty
Disputes in Asia (July 15, 2009), available at http://webb.senate.gov/newsroom/
pressreleases/06-10-2011-01.cfm.
137. Id.
138. See Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: On Her Way Back to the States, supra note
58.
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China Sea. Impending U.S. defense cuts, however, have raised concerns
that, like the official position of the United States in 1995, nothing will
139
If the United
come of Secretary Clinton’s statements to the ARF.
States is going to maintain its credibility in the region, it needs to dispel
the international community of that notion by matching its words with
action. Fortunately, the Obama Administration is off to a good start.
In June 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with
Philippines’ Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Albert del Rosario, in
Washington to discuss Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.140 At
a joint press conference following the meeting, Secretary Clinton stated
[t]he Philippines and the United States are longstanding allies,
and we are committed to honoring our mutual obligations. . . .
We are concerned that recent incidents in the South China Sea
could undermine peace and stability in the region. We urge all
sides to exercise self-restraint, and we will continue to consult
closely with all countries involved, including our treaty ally, the
Philippines. [T]he United States has a national interest in
freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and
unimpeded, lawful commerce in the South China Sea. We share
these interests not only with ASEAN members but with other
maritime nations in the broader international community. The
United States does not take sides on territorial disputes over land
features in the South China Sea, but we oppose the use of force
or the threat of force to advance the claims of any party. We
support resolving disputes through a collaborative diplomatic
presence and process without coercion. We believe governments
should pursue their territorial claims and the accompanying
rights to maritime space in accordance with customary
international law, as reflected also in the Law of the Sea
Convention. The United States supports the 2002 ASEAN China
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
and we encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code
of conduct. We look forward to having discussions on these
issues at the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum in July.141
139. Julianna Goldman & Margaret Talev, Obama Says U.S. Military Presence in Asia Won’t
Diminish with Budget Cuts, BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-11-16/obama-says-budget-constraints-won-t-lessen-u-s-military-plans-in-pacific.html.
140. Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton, Remarks with Philippines Foreign
Secretary Albert del Rosario After Their Meeting (June 23, 2011), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/06/166868.htm.
141. Id.
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In response to a question regarding China’s position that the United
States did not have a role to play in helping resolve the South China Sea
dispute, Secretary Clinton responded that the U.S. position remained the
same:
We support a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants
to resolve their disputes without the use or threat of force. We’re
troubled by the recent incidents in the South China Sea. . . .
These reported incidents clearly present significant maritime
security issues, including the freedom of navigation, respect for
international law, and the lawful, unimpeded economic
development and commerce that all nations are entitled to
pursue. We support the ASEAN China declaration on the
conduct of parties in the South China Sea. And . . . we
encourage the parties to reach a full code of conduct. . . . [T]he
United States [does not] take a position on competing
sovereignty claims over land features. . . . But the United States
is prepared to support the initiatives led by ASEAN and work
with the South China Sea’s claimants to meet their concerns.142
More importantly, in response to a question regarding U.S. intentions
under the mutual defense treaty (MDT), Secretary Clinton responded that
the United States would honor its commitments under the defense
treaty.143 She added that the United States would endeavor “to support
the Philippines in their desires for external support for maritime defense
and the other issues” and was “determined and committed to supporting
the defense of the Philippines,” which includes “trying to find ways of
providing affordable material and equipment that will assist the
Philippine military to take the steps necessary to defend itself.”144
Later that week, Secretary del Rosario met with U.S. Defense
145
At that meeting Secretary
Secretary Robert Gates at the Pentagon.
Gates echoed Secretary Clinton’s assurances, indicating that the United
States was prepared to help the Philippines strengthen their capabilities
to secure their maritime territory.146 And on June 24, 2011, Secretary del
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. US Defense Secretary Gates Expresses Readiness to Strengthen PH’s Capability on
Maritime Security; National Intel Director Clapper Pledges Assistance in Maritime Surveillance,
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
WASHINGTON,
D.C.
(June
24,
2011),
EMBASSY
http://www.philippineembassy-usa.org/news/1904/300/US-Defense-Secretary-Gates-ExpressesReadiness-to-Strengthen-PH-s-Capability-on-Maritime-Security-National-Intel-Direc.
146. Id.
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Rosario met with U.S. National Director for Intelligence James Clapper,
who pledged to enhance intelligence-sharing with Manila to improve the
147
A
Philippines’ maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea.
week later, Philippine and U.S. naval forces, including the Chung-Hoon
(DDG 93), Howard (DDG 83), and Safeguard (T-ARS 50), began the
17th Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan.148 This is only the second time that CARAT
149
The eleven-day exercise focused on “Visit,
has been held on Palawan.
Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) exercises; diver training; salvage
operations; joint medical, dental and civic action projects; and aircrew
familiarization exchanges,” as well as “operations planning, search and
rescue practices, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions,
interagency cooperation and public affairs . . . , maritime interdiction
operations, information sharing, combined operations at sea, patrol
operations and gunnery exercises, plus anti-piracy exercises and antismuggling exercises.”150 Two months later, on August 17, the United
States made good on its earlier promise to enhance Manila’s military
capabilities by delivering a Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutter to the
Philippine Navy.151 A second cutter will be provided in the first or
152
The United States also continues to support
second quarter of 2012.
and finance the completion of the Coast Watch South (CWS) project.153
Once finished, the network of seventeen radar and communication
stations will provide the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) the
ability to better monitor activities in the South China Sea and the Sulu
Sea.154
The Administration has likewise stepped up bilateral military
interaction with Vietnam. In July 2011, for example, Vietnamese naval
units participated in a bilateral exercise off Danang with units from the
147. Id.
148. U.S., Philippine Navies Join for CARAT Exercise in Palawan, EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES—MANILA, http://manila.usembassy.gov/carat2011.html (last visited Apr.
1, 2012).
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Alexis Romero, Second Hamilton-Class Ship to be Deployed to West Phl Sea,
PHILIPPINE
STAR,
Nov.
9,
2011,
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?
articleId=746122&publicationSubCategoryId=63.
152. Id.
153. RENATO DE CASTRO & WALTER LOHMAN, BACKGROUNDER NO. 2593, U.S.–PHILIPPINES
PARTNERSHIP IN THE CAUSE OF MARITIME DEFENSE 9 (2011), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/us-philippines-partnership-in-the-cause-ofmaritime-defense.
154. Id. .
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U.S. Seventh Fleet—Chung-Hoon (DDG-93), Preble (DDG-56), and a
155
The exercise, which was designed to
rescue and salvage ship.
strengthen military ties between the two former enemies, included a
number of non-combat activities, including a search and rescue exercise,
navigation training, and several community-service projects.156 A
similar exercise, involving the John S. Mccain (DDG-56), was conducted
in 2010,157 a few months before Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Tan
Dung announced at the closing of the 17th ASEAN summit that his
158
country was reopening Cam Ranh Bay to foreign navies.
Following these bilateral exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam,
the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullens –
visited China at the invitation of the PLA. At a speech at Renmin
University on July 10, 2011, the Admiral stated that “now more than ever
the United States is a Pacific nation and it is clear that our security
interests and our economic well-being are tied to Asia’s [well-being].”159
He additionally emphasized that the United States was “deepening its
commitment to this region and the alliances and partnerships that define
our presence here [and] . . . . we will remain a Pacific power, just as
China is a Pacific power.”160 More specifically, in response to a
question regarding U.S. military exercises in the region, Admiral Mullen
indicated that the United States has “had a presence in this region for
decades, and . . . certainly the intent is to broaden and deepen our
161
Finally, the Admiral
interests here and our relationships here.”
repeated the U.S. policy that the “United States doesn’t take a position on
resolution of the disputes between two countries, but is very focused on
working towards solutions which are peaceful and don’t result in
conflict.”162

155. Patrick Barta, U.S., Vietnam in Exercises Amid Tensions with China, WALL ST. J., July
16, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304223804576447412748465574.
html.
156. Id.
157. Starr, supra note 64.
158. Vietnam to Reopen Cam Ranh Bay to Foreign Fleets: PM, BANGKOK POST, Oct.
31, 2010, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/204055/vietnam-to-reopen-cam-ranhbay-to-foreign-fleets-pm.
159. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Speech on U.S.China
Relations
at
Remin
Univ.
(July
10,
2011),
available
at
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/07/20110712154723su0.286262
2.html#axzz1fZF85UfC.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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The next day, in response to a statement by General Chen Bingde,
Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, at a joint press conference in
Beijing that U.S. naval exercises with Vietnam and the Philippines were
“extremely inappropriate,” Admiral Mullen reiterated that the United
States would maintain its presence in the Asia Pacific and emphasized
that U.S. reconnaissance flights and other military operations and
exercises “are all conducted in accordance with international norms, and
163
Rear
essentially we will continue to comply with that in the future.”
Admiral Tom Carney, Commander Logistics Group Western
Pacific/Commander Task Force 73, speaking in Danang, Vietnam later
that day, echoed Admiral Mullen’s statement, indicating that the United
States has “had a presence in the Western Pacific and the South China
Sea for 50 to 60 years, even going back before World War II [and] . . . .
[w]e have no intention of departing from that kind of activity.”164
Finally, on his return trip to Washington, Admiral Mullen told reporters
at a press conference in Tokyo on July 15, 2011, that “the United States
is a Pacific power [and] . . . . we are not going away.”165 More
specifically, in response to a question regarding Chinese aggression in
the South China Sea, the Chairman re-stated that the United States does
not take a position with respect to resolving the disputes.166 However, he
stressed that the United States takes a “very strong position with respect
to the international standard of freedom of navigation. And it isn’t
whether or not the United States is involved in a freedom of navigation
issue, because a violation of a freedom of navigation issue by anybody is
of concern to many, many countries internationally.”167 Admiral Mullen
concluded the press conference by stating that peace and stability in the
Asia Pacific region “is critical to those who live here, but also to the
United States.”168
Several months later, in November 2011, the United States and the
Philippines marked the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines MDT
with the signing of the Manila Declaration on board the Fitzgerald (DDG

163. Michael Martina, China Raps U.S. Over Military Drills in Disputed Seas,
REUTERS, July 11, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/11/us-china-us-militaryidUSTRE76A25J20110711.
164. Barta, supra note 155.
165. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Remarks at the U.S.
Embassy in Tokyo, Japan (July 15, 2011), available at http://www.jcs.mil/
speech.aspx?id=1631.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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169
In the declaration, the
62) in Manila Bay on November 16, 2011.
Philippines and the United States reaffirm “the continuing relevance of
the treaty for peace, security, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region . .
. . [and] reaffirm the treaty as the foundation of our relationship for the
170
In this regard both sides “expect to
next 60 years and beyond.”
maintain a robust, balanced, and responsive security partnership
including cooperating to enhance the defense, interdiction, and
apprehension capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”171
Both sides also indicated that they “share a common interest in
maintaining freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, and
transit of people across the seas and subscribe to a rules-based approach
in resolving competing claims in maritime areas through peaceful,
collaborative, multilateral, and diplomatic processes within the
framework of international law.”172
Three days later, at the East Asian Summit (EAS) in Bali, Indonesia,
Asia-Pacific leaders stressed the importance of regional cooperation to
address the region’s political and security challenges, including maritime
security.173 President Obama’s participation in the event underscored
the U.S. commitment, previously articulated by Secretary Clinton and
other administration officials, to remain actively engaged in the region.
With regard to maritime security issues, the President emphasized that

[t]he Asia-Pacific region is home to some of the world’s busiest
ports and most critical lines of commerce and communication.
Recent decades of broad regional economic success have been
underpinned by a shared commitment to freedom of navigation
and international law. At the same time, the region faces a host
of maritime challenges, including territorial and maritime
disputes, ongoing naval military modernization, trafficking of
illicit materials, piracy, and natural disasters.174
The President also articulated a “principles-based U.S. approach to
maritime security, including freedom of navigation and overflight and
169. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Signing of the Manila Declaration on Board
the USS Fitzgerald in Manila Bay, Manila (Nov. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177226.htm. Philippines.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See generally Office of the Press Sec’y,, White House, Fact Sheet: East Asia
Summit (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/19/factsheet-east-asia-summit.
174. Id.
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other internationally lawful uses of the seas, as well as use of
175
He
collaborative diplomatic processes to address disputes.”
additionally “expressed strong opposition to the threat or use of force by
any party to advance its territorial or maritime claims or interfere in
legitimate economic activity” and reiterated U.S. support for the 2002
ASEAN Declaration of Conduct and encouraged all parties to conclude a
full code at the earliest opportunity.176 The President further stated that
the United States is working with its partners in the Asia-Pacific region
to build capacity and promote cooperation on maritime security issues
by:
•

•

•

•

Providing training, assistance, and equipment to regional
maritime police and civil authorities to enhance their
capabilities to secure the maritime space and address
transnational security challenges such as piracy, illicit
trafficking, and illegal fishing;
Building facilities and providing equipment and technical
support to enhance the ability of Southeast Asian nations to
monitor the maritime domain and assess and share
information;
Hosting regional workshops to promote adherence to
standard operating procedures and protocols that ensure
safety at sea, help build a shared vision of international
norms and behaviors in the maritime domain, and foster
discussion of interpretations of customary international law;
and
Hosting and co-hosting multinational capacity-building
exercises with regional military partners.177

Then on November 16, 2011, President Obama announced that the
United States intended to increase its military presence in Australia
178
Speaking at a joint press conference in
beginning in mid-2012.
Canberra on November 16, 2011, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard
stated that the two long-time allies had agreed

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. U.S. President Barack Obama & Austl. Prime Minister Julia Gillard, Remarks at
Joint Press Conference in Canberra, Australia (Nov. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/16/remarks-president-obama-andprime-minister-gillard-australia-joint-press.
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to expand the existing collaboration between the Australian
Defence Force and the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force
. . . [Beginning in] mid-2012, Australia will welcome
deployments of a company-size rotation of 200 to 250 Marines
179
in the Northern Territory for around six months at a time.
The total force is expected to grow to around 2,500 personnel over the
next few years. In addition, a second component of the initiate grants
greater access by U.S. military aircraft to the Royal Australian
Air Force facilities in our country’s north. This will involve
more frequent movements of U.S. military aircraft into and out
of northern Australia. Now, taken together, these two initiatives
make our alliance stronger, they strengthen our cooperation in
our region.180
Prime Minister Gillard added that the U.S.-Australia alliance
has been a bedrock of stability in our region. So building on our
alliance through this new initiative is about stability. . . . It will
be good for our Australian Defence Force to increase their
capabilities by joint training, combined training, with the U.S.
Marines and personnel. It will mean that we are postured to
better respond together, along with other partners in the Asia
Pacific, to any regional contingency, including the provision of
181
humanitarian assistance and dealing with natural disasters.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
There are a number of measures the United States should take to
continue to reassure friends and allies that it is committed to maintaining
a long-term presence in the Pacific as a counter-weight to growing
Chinese military power and aggressive behavior.
First, the United States should follow Indonesia’s lead and
diplomatically protest China’s U-shaped line claim in the South China
Sea.182
This can be done without taking sides on the underlying
territorial disputes between China and the other Spratly claimants. The
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the U.N.
Secretary General Referencing the May 2009 Circular Note of the People’s Republic of
China (July 8, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_ mys_vnm_e.pdf.
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United States should also encourage its regional partners (e.g., Australia,
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore) and other
maritime states (e.g., United Kingdom, Germany, France, Norway,
Netherlands, Panama, Liberia, Cyprus, Marshall Islands, and the
Bahamas) to do the same. Indonesia does not have a dog in the fight
over the Spratly Islands, yet it has already filed an official protest to
China’s nine-dotted line claim in the South China Sea, indicating that
183
claim has no basis in international law.
Secondly, the United States must maintain a robust and visible naval
presence in the region through frequent deployments and routine FON
operations,184 particularly in the vicinity of the islets occupied by China.
A good starting place for such operations would be in the Paracel Islands
and in the vicinity of Mischief Reef, both of which are occupied by
Chinese military forces. There is evidence of possible Congressional
support for such an initiative. For example, on June 27, 2011 Senate
Resolution 217 passed by unanimous consent, providing in part that the
Senate “supports the continuation of operations by the United States
Armed Forces in support of freedom of navigation rights in international
waters and air space in the South China Sea.”185 Increased bilateral
exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea
discussed above, as well as the rotational deployments of U.S. Marines to
Australia, are also a step in the right direction. The Administration must
also not give in to Chinese pressure to stop or reduce U.S. surveillance
operations in and over the EEZ. As Admiral Mullen reiterated in his last
183. See id.
184. The U.S. FON Program was established in 1979 by the Carter Administration to
exercise and assert navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in
a manner that is consistent with the international law of the sea. See generally DEP’T OF
DEF.,
MARITIME
CLAIMS
REFERENCE
MANUAL
(2005),
available
at
www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/ MCRM.pdf. The Program is designed
to challenge excessive maritime claims and demonstrate U.S. non-acquiescence in
unilateral acts of other states that are designed to restrict navigation and overflight rights
and freedoms of the international community and other lawful uses of the seas related to
those rights and freedoms. Id. The FON Program operates on a triple track, including
diplomatic representations by the Department of State and operational assertions by U.S.
naval and air assets, as well as bilateral and multilateral consultations with other
governments in order to promote maritime stability and consistency in applying the law
of the sea. Id. In short, the Program underscores the U.S. commitment to a stable legal
regime for the world’s oceans. Id. Since its inception, hundreds of operational challenges
and diplomatic protests have been conducted to demonstrate U.S. non-acquiescence in
excessive maritime claims. Id.
185. S. Res. 217, 112th Cong., (2011), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112sres 217ats/ pdf/BILLS-112sres217ats.pdf.
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trip to the Pacific, the United States has “operated in the South China Sea
for many decades . . . [and] will continue to do that, and I’m sure other
186
Accordingly, the United States should
countries will as well.”
continue to conduct lawful military operations and exercises in the
187
region, including surveillance and reconnaissance flights.
Third, the United States should also use economic sanctions to warn
China that it will not tolerate further threats. Threats against the United
States and other international entities or corporations that seek to do
business with other South China Sea claimants, particularly Vietnam,
should be answered with targeted economic sanctions and reciprocal
treatment of Chinese business interests in the United States. Vietnam is
of heightened concern because of the particularly egregious Chinese
interference with Vietnamese survey activities within Vietnam’s EEZ,
referenced above.188 Chinese marine surveillance ships have interfered
with Vietnamese survey ships despite the fact that the targeted
Vietnamese vessels were operating within Vietnam’s 200 nm EEZ and
there was no Chinese land feature or disputed territory within 200 nms of
where the incident occurred.189 Vietnam has the exclusive right under
international law to explore, exploit, and manage the living and nonliving resources located within its EEZ and continental shelf and such a
blatant disregard of Vietnam’s rights in its own EEZ by China are
especially disconcerting.190
Fourth, the United States must officially protest and make public
each and every incident where Chinese ships and aircraft aggressively
interfere with U.S. military ships and aircraft in violation of international
191
Similar
law, including the UNCLOS and the Collision Regulations.
protests should be filed when cargo ships and fishing vessels are used as
government proxies to interfere with U.S. ships. Sporadic, non-public
demarches by the United States give the wrong impression to the
international community and the American public that unlawful and
unsafe Chinese interference with U.S. ships and aircraft, like the
Bowditch, EP-3, Impeccable, and Victorious, are isolated incidents. In
186. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Remarks at the U.S.
Embassy, Tokyo, Japan (July 15, 2011), available at http://www.jcs.mil/
speech.aspx?id=1631.
187. See Martina, supra note 163.
188. See VN Demands China Stop Sovereignty Violations, supra note 52; see also Sea
spat raises China-Vietnam tensions, supra note 54.
189. Id.
190. See UNCLOS, supra note 19, arts. 56, 77, at 418, 429-30.
191. International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1601-08
(2006).
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reality, unlawful Chinese interference with U.S. military activities in the
EEZ has become a matter of routine.
Fifth, the United States must re-examine its position from 1995 with
192
regard to the Philippine claims in the South China Sea, and continue to
reiterate its defense commitments under the U.S.-Philippine Mutual
193
particularly with respect to Scarborough Shoal and
Defense Treaty,
the Kalayaan Island Group. By not taking a position on the Philippine
claims, the United States is, in effect, taking a position in support of
China’s illegal claims. Because the Philippines have a superior claim to
these islands, under articles IV and V of the Treaty, the United States
must acknowledge its obligation to protect the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, its public vessels, and its aircraft “in the Pacific.”194 U.S.
support would counter Chinese “checkbook diplomacy” and prevent the
AFP from falling under China’s sphere of influence. Bilateral exercises
between the AFP and U.S. Armed Forces should focus on developing
contingency plans to confront Chinese aggression in the South China
Sea. Exercises conducted off Palawan in 2011 and 2012 appear to be
headed in the right direction.
Finally, the United States should encourage the other claimants to
resolve their sovereignty disputes so that they can present a unified front
against China in any future negotiations. One possible option would be
to recognize respective sovereignty claims over islands that are currently
occupied by the various claimants. Unless the other claimants can
resolve their differences, they will be unable to present a unified position
towards China, allowing the Chinese government to continue to apply its
“divide and conquer” strategy while insisting on bilateral negotiations.
U.S. actions must not, however, be limited to the South China Sea.
The United States must apply equal pressure along the entire seawall to
prevent further fortification by China.
To the north, the United States must reiterate its commitment to a
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act,195 which provides that “any effort to determine the future
of Taiwan by other than peaceful means . . . [would be] of grave concern
192. When asked in 1995 whether the South China Sea issue was applicable to the
U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, the State Department spokesperson responded:
“We do have the defense treaty, and of course the United States honors its treaty
commitments. But I don’t have anything beyond that related to the possible relationship
of that to the maritime issues.” Shelly, supra note 133.
193. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the Rep. of the Phil. and the U.S., Aug. 20, 1951,
3 U.S.T. 3947, available at http://www.vfacom.ph/resource/mdt1951.pdf.
194. Id. arts. IV, V.
195. Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-16 (2006).
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196
to the United States.” Furthermore, U.S. warships, including carriers
and big deck amphibious ships, must conduct routine and frequent
transits through the Taiwan Strait. The days of worrying about how
China will react to the transit of a U.S. aircraft carrier through an
international strait with a large high seas/EEZ corridor must cease
immediately.
With regard to the Senkakus, the time has come for the United States
to back its treaty partner and recognize Japanese sovereignty over the
islands. This issue has taken on a new meaning following the September
2010 incident between the Chinese fishing boat and the Japanese coast
guard.197 The islands were placed under U.S. trusteeship pursuant to
article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty198 and were administered by
the United States from 1953 to 1971, without Chinese objection.199 In
1971, the United States returned administrative control over the
200
If the
Senkakus to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.
Senkakus had been considered Chinese territory at the end of the Second
World War, the islands would not have been placed under U.S.
administration in 1953. The United States has made it clear to Japan that
the Senkaku Islands are covered by the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security
Treaty.201 However, the United States must also make clear to China
that continued incursions in the vicinity of the Senkakus are unacceptable
and that U.S. defense commitments under article V of the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty, which provides that “[e]ach [p]arty recognizes that an
armed attack against either [p]arty in the territories under the
administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
and . . . that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with

196. Id. § 3301.
197. Calum MacLoad, China’s Aggressive Posture Stuns Japan, Experts, USA TODAY,
Sept.
28,
2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-09-28japanchina28_ST_N.htm.
198. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, available at
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm. Although Article III does not
explicitly mention the Senkakus, later proclamations defined the boundaries of “Nansei
Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude” to include the Senkakus) Id.; NIKSCH, supra
note 85, at 1.
199. See generally NIKSCH, supra note 85.
200. Agreement Between Japan and the U.S. Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the
Daito
Islands,
June
17,
1971,
23
U.S.T.
446,
available
at
http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/ archive/rev71.html.
201. Hillary Clinton & Pham Gia Khiem, Remarks at the East Asia Summit (Oct. 30,
2010), available at
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/October/
20101031105353su0.604421.html&distid=ucs.
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202

its constitutional provisions and processes,” apply to the Senkakus.
Additionally, routine military exercises should continue to be conducted
with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and
contingency plans developed to counter Chinese aggression in the East
China Sea. Bilateral and multilateral exercises with the JMSDF in the
East China Sea in December 2010 (Keen Sword),203 January 2011
(Yama Sakura),204 April 2011 (Malabar),205 and October/November
206
are a step in the right direction.
2011 (Annual)
Moving to the high north, the Chinese reaction to the proposed joint
military exercises off the Korean Peninsula is consistent with the Chinese
government’s untenable position that foreign military activities in the
EEZ are subject to coastal notice and consent. While China’s position on
the EEZ is clearly inconsistent with international law, including
UNCLOS, the fact that the United States failed to send the George
Washington into the Yellow Sea after Chinese objections to the joint
exercises bolsters China’s position on the EEZ internationally and
undermines U.S. FON interests, not only in the Pacific, but
worldwide.207 The Administration’s decision to keep the carrier to the
east of the Korean Peninsula for the first exercise was viewed as a sign of
weakness, which will embolden Chinese officials to raise similar
objections to future U.S. operations in the Pacific, and will be exploited
by the Chinese Government, both domestically and internationally, as
part of its lawfare strategy. The Administration’s failure to include the
George Washington in the second and third round of exercises, and
providing prior notification for the November exercise, only exacerbates
the problem. As a matter of priority, the United States must continue to
conduct frequent and unannounced exercises and operations in the
Yellow Sea, including carrier operations.

202. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan and the U.S., art. 5, Jan. 19,
1960, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.
203. Capt. D. Herndon, Sun Sets on Keen Sword Exercise, AIR FORCE PRINT NEWS
TODAY, Dec. 10, 2010, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123234381.
204. B. J. Weiner, U.S.-Japan Bilateral Exercise Begins in Japan, ARMY NEWS FRONT
PAGE, Jan. 22, 2011, http://www.army.mil/-news/2011/01/22/50761-us-japan-bilateralexercise-begins-in-japan-with-senior-japanese-leader-visits/.
205. India, Japan, U.S. Navies to Hold Military Exercises Off Okinawa Coast, Japan,
INDIA DEFENCE.COM, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www.india-defence.com/reports-5023.
206. U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affiars, U.S. Navy, U.S. 7th Fleet to Participate in ANNUAL
U.S.
7TH
FLEET,
Oct.
18,
2011,
Exercise
2011,
COMMANDER
http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2011/10-october/024.htm.
207. For a discussion of the illegality of China’s claims with regard to military
activities in the EEZ, see generally Pedrozo, supra note 86.
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Finally, although the United States has diplomatically protested
many of China’s excessive maritime claims, it has not operationally
challenged these claims under the FON Program for more than ten years.
For instance, the United States has not challenged China’s excessive
baselines or prior permission requirement for innocent passage since
208
The only exception to this paucity of FON challenges is U.S.
1997.
intelligence and marine data collection activities in and above China’s
EEZ by U.S. Special Mission Ships (SMS) and sensitive reconnaissance
operations (SRO) aircraft.209 While the United States must continue a
robust and visible SMS and SRO program in the South China, East
China, and Yellow Seas, U.S. ships and aircraft must also challenge
China’s excessive territorial sea and straight baseline claims at the
earliest opportunity.
VI. CONCLUSION
A renowned Singaporean diplomat and scholar—Ambassador
Tommy Koh—recently wrote that although “China may be up and the
US down at the moment … in the near term the US will ‘bounce back
from this adversity as it had from all its previous adversities’ . . . and it
will rebound not as a hegemon but as the ‘undisputable leader of the
world.’”210 I agree with the Ambassador, but the United States can only
reassert its role in the Pacific and counter China’s growing influence in
the region by increasing its naval presence and demonstrating support for
its regional partners with actions, not words. Continuing to appease
China will ultimately embolden Beijing to further solidify its seawall and
fully implement its anti-access strategy and illegal maritime claims in the
South China, East China, and Yellow Seas. As President Obama
remarked in November 2011, the United States welcomes
a rising, peaceful China. . . . [However,] with their rise comes
increased responsibilities. It’s important for them to play by the
rules of the road. . . . So where China is playing by those rules
. . . I think this is a win-win situation. There are going to be
times where they’re not, and we will send a clear message to
them that we think that they need to be on track in terms of
208. Dep’t of Defense, supra note 120.
209. See Dep’t of Def., MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, CHINA, PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF 2 (2011), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/
documents/mcrm/china.pdf.
210. PAUL EVANS, SINGAPORE DEBATES AMERICA (2010), available at
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1042010.pdf.
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accepting the rules and responsibilities that come with being a
211
world power.

211. President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister
Gillard of Australia in Joint Press Conference, (Nov. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/16/remarks-president-obama-andprime-minister-gillard-australia-joint-press.

